Roesler, Anne-Katrin (Northwestern
University) and Szentes, Balázs (LSE)
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly
Pricing
This paper analyzes a
bilateral trade model where the buyerís valuation for the object is
uncertain and she observes
only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or -leave-it offer
to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which
maximize
the buyerís expected payoff.
We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates
(i) efficient trade and (ii) a
unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other
buyer-optimal signal structure
yields the same outcome as the one we identify, in particular,
the same price.
Date: Nov. 15, Tuesday 4:15pm
Place: BME, Building „Q”, Room QBF13