

# Impact of Forecast errors on Generation and Transmission Expansion Planning

Workshop on Mathematical Models and Methods for Energy Optimization (Budapest)

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
<sup>1</sup>University of Copenhagen, funded by FEMs project ([www.futureelmarket.dk](http://www.futureelmarket.dk))

<sup>2</sup>Technical University of Denmark, funded by CITIES project ([www.smart-cities-centre.org](http://www.smart-cities-centre.org))

September, 25, 2014

# Energy systems

- A **power system** is a network of electrical components used to supply, transmit and use electric power
- Electricity cannot be **stored**: generation = demand
- Increase in production by **renewable** sources: new challenges




Source: Berkeley Lab estimates based on data from Navigant, EIA, and elsewhere


# Wind power production

- Wind power production **varies** through time
- Wind power production is **hard to predict** in advance

Demand DK2 (12/08/14)



Wind DK2 (12/08/14)



## We were wondering...

- How can we account for forecast errors within current generation and transmission capacity expansion models?
- What is the impact of these forecast errors on generation and transmission capacity expansion planning?
- What is the impact of the market design on generation and transmission capacity expansion planning?


# Some assumptions

- Static expansion models (single target year)
- Focus on short-term uncertainties (scenarios)
- No inter-temporal constraints (stationary process)
- Energy-only market with marginal pricing
- Perfect competitive market
- Convex production cost functions
- Inelastic demand
- DC representation of the network

# Two markets floors

Day-ahead market  
(24 hours before operation)

Balancing market  
(30 minutes before operation)



# Coordination between the two market floors

## Inefficient market

Day-ahead:  $\min \mathcal{C}^D(\Phi^D)$

$\Phi^D$

Balancing:  $\min \mathcal{C}^B(\Phi^D, \Phi^B)$

- Cheapest day-ahead
- Expensive balancing
- High total cost
- Reserves after energy

## Efficient market

Day-ahead + balancing  
 $\min \mathcal{C}^D(\Phi^D) + \sum_r \pi_r \mathcal{C}^B(\Phi^D, \Phi^B)$

- More expensive day-ahead
- Cheaper balancing
- Minimum total cost
- Simultaneous reserve and energy

# We have investigated

- The impact of forecast errors on GE of stochastic units by a central planner:
  - Central GEP without forecast errors
  - Central GEP with forecast errors under efficient market
  - Central GEP with forecast errors under inefficient market
- How a collusion of producers affects the GE of stochastic units:
  - Collusion GEP without forecast errors
  - Collusion GEP with forecast errors under efficient market
  - Collusion GEP with forecast errors under inefficient market
- The impact of forecast errors on G&T expansion by a central planner:
  - G&TEP without forecast errors
  - G&TEP with forecast errors under efficient market
  - G&TEP with forecast errors under inefficient market



# Central GEP without forecast errors

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Min}_{\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D} \quad \sum_s \tau_s \mathcal{C}^D (\Phi_s^D) + \mathcal{C}^I (\bar{p}^W) \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \\
 & \quad \quad h^D (\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0, \quad \forall s \\
 & \quad \quad g^D (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0, \quad \forall s.
 \end{aligned}$$

$\bar{p}^W$  capacity to be installed

$\Phi_s^D$  dispatch decisions

$\rho_s$  capacity factor of stochastic units

## Central GEP with forecast errors under efficient market

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Min}_{\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B} \sum_s \tau_s \left( c^D(\Phi_s^D) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} c^B(\Phi_{sr}^B) \right) + c^I(\bar{p}^W) \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \\
 & \quad h^D(\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0, \quad \forall s \\
 & \quad g^D(\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0, \quad \forall s \\
 & \quad h^B(\Phi_{sr}^B) = 0, \quad \forall s, \forall r \\
 & \quad g^B(\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B; \rho_s, \Delta\rho_{sr}) \leq 0, \quad \forall s, \forall r.
 \end{aligned}$$

$\Phi_{sr}^B$  re-dispatch decisions

$\Delta\rho_{sr}$  variation of capacity factor

# Central GEP with forecast errors under inefficient market

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \underset{\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B}{\text{Min}} && \sum_s \tau_s \left( \mathcal{C}^D(\Phi_s^D) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \mathcal{C}^B(\Phi_{sr}^B) \right) + \mathcal{C}^I(\bar{p}^W) \\
 & \text{s.t.} && f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \\
 & && h^B(\Phi_{sr}^B) = 0, \quad \forall s, \forall r \\
 & && g^B(\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B; \rho_s, \Delta\rho_{sr}) \leq 0, \quad \forall s, \forall r \\
 & && \Phi_s^D \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \underset{\Phi_s^D}{\text{Min}} \quad \mathcal{C}^D(\Phi_s^D) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^D(\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0 \\ \quad \quad g^D(\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0. \end{array} \right\} \forall s.
 \end{aligned}$$

Impose cost merit-order at the day-ahead

# Data of illustrative example

- Four 100-MW inflexible blocks with marginal costs 20, 21, 22, 23
- Two 100-MW flexible blocks with marginal costs 24, 25
- A constant load of 400 MW and no network
- Expansion of one hundred 5-MW units with a cost of \$430000
- Two time segments:  $\rho_{s1} = 0.2$  and  $\rho_{s2} = 0.8$
- Four equiprobable scenarios for forecast errors:

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$\Delta\rho_{s1r1} = -0.07$	$\Delta\rho_{s1r2} = -0.02$	$\Delta\rho_{s1r3} = 0.02$	$\Delta\rho_{s1r4} = 0.08$
$\Delta\rho_{s2r1} = -0.26$	$\Delta\rho_{s2r2} = -0.02$	$\Delta\rho_{s2r3} = 0.10$	$\Delta\rho_{s2r4} = 0.18$

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# Generation expansion under perfect competition

	$\bar{p}$ (MW)	$c^I$ (\$M)	$\bar{c}^D$ (\$M)	$\bar{c}^B$ (\$M)	$\bar{c}$ (\$M)	$\psi$ (%)
No errors	410	35.26	35.82	0.00	71.08	51.25
Efficient	360	30.96	42.35	-0.83	72.48	45.02
Inefficient	250	21.50	50.58	2.45	74.54	28.34

- Without forecast errors we get the highest capacity and wind share
- Forecast errors reduce the installed capacity and the wind share
- An efficient market designs soften the adverse effects of forecast errors

# Collusion GEP without forecast errors

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{\bar{p}^W} \quad & \sum_s \tau_s \Pi^D (\Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D) - C^I (\bar{p}^W) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$(\Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D) \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_s^D} \quad C^D (\Phi_s^D) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^D (\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0 : \lambda_s^D \\ \quad \quad g^D (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0 \end{array} \right\} \forall s$$

$\Pi^D$  revenue in the day-ahead market

$\lambda_s^D$  day-ahead price

# Collusion GEP with forecast errors under efficient market

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{\bar{p}^W} \quad & \sum_s \tau_s \left( \Pi^D (\Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \Pi^B (\Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B) \right) - \mathcal{C}^I (\bar{p}^W) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} \Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D \\ \Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B \end{array} \right) \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B} \quad \mathcal{C}^D (\Phi_s^D) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \mathcal{C}^B (\Phi_{sr}^B) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^D (\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0 : \lambda_s^D \\ g^D (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0 \\ h^B (\Phi_{sr}^B) = 0 : \pi_{sr} \lambda_{sr}^B, \quad \forall r \\ g^B (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B; \rho_s, \Delta \rho_{sr}) \leq 0, \quad \forall r \end{array} \right\} \forall s$$

$\Pi^B$  revenue in the balancing market

$\lambda_{sr}^B$  balancing price

# Collusion GEP with forecast errors under inefficient market

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Max}_{\bar{p}^W} \quad \sum_s \tau_s \left( \Pi^D (\Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \Pi^B (\Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B) \right) - \mathcal{C}^I (\bar{p}^W) \\
 & \text{s.t.} \quad f(\bar{p}^W) \leq 0 \\
 & (\Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D) \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_s^D} \quad \mathcal{C}^D (\Phi_s^D) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^D (\Phi_s^D; l_s) = 0 : \lambda_s^D \\ \quad \quad g^D (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s) \leq 0 \end{array} \right\} \forall s \\
 & (\Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B) \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_{sr}^B} \quad \mathcal{C}^B (\Phi_{sr}^B) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^B (\Phi_{sr}^B) = 0 : \lambda_{sr}^B \\ \quad \quad g^B (\bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B; \rho_s, \Delta \rho_{sr}) \leq 0 \end{array} \right\} \forall sr.
 \end{aligned}$$



## Collusion GEP with forecast errors under inefficient market

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{\bar{p}^W} \quad & \sum_s \pi_s \left( \Pi^D \left( \Phi_s^D, \hat{\lambda}_s^D \right) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \Pi^B \left( \Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B \right) \right) - \mathcal{C}^I \left( \bar{p}^W \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & f \left( \bar{p}^W \right) \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\left( \begin{array}{c} \Phi_s^D, \lambda_s^D \\ \Phi_{sr}^B, \lambda_{sr}^B \end{array} \right) \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B} \quad \mathcal{C}^D \left( \Phi_s^D \right) + \sum_r \pi_{sr} \mathcal{C}^B \left( \Phi_{sr}^B \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^B \left( \Phi_{sr}^B \right) = 0 : \pi_{sr} \lambda_{sr}^B \\ g^B \left( \bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D, \Phi_{sr}^B; \rho_s, \Delta \rho_{sr} \right) \leq 0 \end{array} \right\} \forall s$$

$$\Phi_s^D \in \arg \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Min}_{\Phi_s^D} \quad \mathcal{C}^D \left( \Phi_s^D \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad h^D \left( \Phi_s^D; l_s \right) = 0 : \hat{\lambda}_s^D \\ g^D \left( \bar{p}^W, \Phi_s^D; \rho_s \right) \leq 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

# Generation expansion under imperfect competition


	Perfect competition			Collusion		
	$\bar{p}$ (MW)	$\bar{C}$ (\$M)	$\psi$ (%)	$\bar{p}$ (MW)	$\bar{C}$ (\$M)	$\psi$ (%)
No errors	410	71.08	51.25	305	71.69	38.14
Efficient	360	72.48	45.02	200	73.84	25.01
Inefficient	250	74.54	28.34	120	74.99	13.60

- Under a collusion the installed capacities decrease
- Forecast errors reduce the capacity and the wind share
- An efficient market designs soften the adverse effects of forecast errors

# Generation and transmission expansion models

- Investment decisions made by a central planner
- New stochastic and conventional generation
- New transmission lines
- Day-ahead and a balancing market
- Forecast errors of load and wind production
- Efficient and inefficient market design

# Generation and transmission expansion models



- 24-bus system (IEEE)
- 10 existing conventional units
- 3 flexible generating units
- Variable demand
- 4 projects of stochastic units
- 3 new flexible generating units
- 7 new transmission lines
- Renewable target of 20/30/40%

## G&amp;T expansion for 20% renewable target

		No errors	Efficient	Inefficient
Wind capacity	$n_6$	-	-	50
	$n_8$	950	1000	900
	$n_{13}$	-	-	-
	$n_{23}$	400	350	450
Flexible Generation	$n_{18}$	-	-	-
	$n_{21}$	-	80	-
	$n_{22}$	-	-	160
Line capacity	$n_6 n_{10}$	-	-	-
	$n_8 n_9$	-	-	-
	$n_{11} n_{13}$	175	175	175
	$n_{11} n_{14}$	-	-	175
	$n_{12} n_{21}$	-	350	-
	$n_{12} n_{23}$	-	-	-
	$n_{14} n_{16}$	-	-	175
Investment cost		162.6	165.1	172.8

# Impact of forecast errors on G&T expansion

Market	Expansion	Renewable target		
		20%	30%	40%
Efficient	Errors	474.8(20)	527.8(30)	589.2(40)
	No errors	475.5(19.2)	530.7(26.5)	587.7(31.5)
Inefficient	Errors	484.2(20)	543.6(30)	607.8(40)
	No errors	526.5(19.3)	631.7(28.7)	728.2(36.1)

- Under an efficient market, disregarding the errors will entail a reduction of the renewable target
- Under an inefficient market, disregarding the errors will entail a significant increase of the cost

# Conclusions

- We have presented a set of generation and transmission expansion models that account for the forecast errors of stochastic production
- These models can be reformulated as single-level mixed-integer linear or non-linear programming problems
- Considering production forecast errors impacts the expansion plans for the generation and transmission of power systems
- An efficient market design softens the negative effects of forecast errors and leads to cheaper expansion plans and higher penetration levels of renewable production
- The consequences of an expansion plan determined under an error-free assumption highly depend on the market design

# Future research

- Model intermediate situations at the investment level between perfect competition and collusion
- Model intermediate market designs between the paradigmatic efficient and inefficient
- Model the exercise of market power by the producers when offering in the electricity market
- Apply dedicated computational methods to improve tractability of the multi-year case



# Thanks for the attention!

## Questions?

Website: <https://sites.google.com/site/slv2pm/>